We design a method to identify and test for bid rigging in procurement auctions with limited information. Public procurement data sets usually lack detailed data that are needed to implement existing methods. We develop a varying-coefficient model to estimate the auction-specific coefficient of competition and use the coefficient as the collusion measure. The method can be implemented to limited data sets using standard econometric tools and software. We implement the methodology to a unique data set about all Turkish public procurement auctions in years 2005-2012, numbering 565,298. We find that collusion significantly increases procurement costs and decreases procurement efficiency in Turkey.
Introduction
Governments allocate significant resources to deter collusion in public procurement auctions. Collusive agreements among firms aim to limit competition and artificially increase procurement prices above the competitive level. To prosecute and, by so doing, deter future collusion, tools are needed to detect collusive behavior. All the existing methods require either the knowledge of all submitted bids (Bajari and Ye, 2003) , the complete bidding history or characteristics of individual firms, or prior knowledge about potential colluders (Porter and Zona, 1999) . Although governments might benefit substantially by detecting and deterring collusion in public procurement (PP) auctions, policy makers are facing many challenges to implement these methodologies. Most importantly, detailed information required to implement these methodologies is not available especially in developing countries. The available data sets for many countries including Chile, Mexico, Turkey and the European Union only contain information about the outcomes of the PP process namely winning bids and number of bidders. This paper aims to fill this need by developing a collusion detection methodology that does not require the complete bidding history or detailed prior information about potential colluders. Additionally, we would like to devise a method that is easy to execute and flexible enough to be implemented to a wide range of data sets with limited information. Collusion detection tools can increase PP efficiency and improve government budget deficits if policy makers can use them to identify potential colluders. Accordingly, we deliberately refrain from structural auction models that require complex theoretical derivations and use different sets of assumptions that might differ across countries. We hope that policy makers would be able to implement the methodology developed in this paper to limited data sets by using standard econometric tools and software.
After presenting the theoretical background and details of the new methodology, we implement it to a unique data set about Turkish PP auctions to study the structure of collusive behavior and its impact on auction outcomes in Turkey .
We first present the theoretical background of the bidding behavior of a bidding ring based on the independent private values auction models. Krishna (2010) shows that a bidding ring can be modeled using a two-step procedure.
In the first step, the bidding ring members conduct a pre-auction knockout auction among ring members to determine the member who would represent the ring in the auction and submit the winning bid among ring members. In the second stage, the other ring members submit phony bids to form an illusion of competition. Accordingly, the member of the bid ring can win the procurement price with a higher price and higher profits. This argument indicates that the winning bid would be significantly higher compared to a procurement auction with competitive bidding. In a reduced-form econometric setting, the effect of bid-rigging mentioned above is captured by the coefficient of number of bidders. Ohashi (2009) states that "In the presence of collusion among bidders, we certainly do not expect the (number of bidders variable) to negatively effect the bids." (page 276) Using this argument, we design a collusion detection methodology by calculating the coefficient of number of bidders for each auction.
We develop and estimate an unobserved components model of winning bids to gauge auction-specific coefficients. We use these auction-specific coefficients to rank collusive behavior in each auction. Finally, we use this new method to empirically examine Turkish PP auctions.
The Public Procurement Authority of Turkey (PPAT) registers outcomes of all PP auctions by law. The PPAT publicly provides a data set that contains detailed information about all PP auctions conducted in years 2005-2012, numbering 565,298. The total value of procurement in this period is over three hundred billion US Dollars. There are no studies that examine collusion in Turkish PP auctions although a comprehensive and rich data set is officially available. Similar to many publicly available PP data sets, the PPAT data set lacks information about all submitted bids. Instead, it contains variables about the auction outcome such as the winning bid and number of bidders. We conduct an empirical analysis using the new method and examine collusion in Turkish PP auctions. We find that there is a positive and significant relationship between the new collusion measure and procurement costs as indicated by theoretical arguments. This result suggests that the new measure successfully ranks auctions with respect to the level of collusive behavior.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the existing collusion detection methods and publicly available data sets that can not be examined using these methods. Section 3 describes the theoretical structure of bid-rigging behavior and limited competition. Section 4 presents the new collusion measure and estimation methodology. Section 5 displays the empirical analysis of collusion in Turkish PP auctions and section 6 concludes the paper. Additionally, studies such as Brosig and Reiss (2007) conduct experiments and test theoretical implications of collusion using experimental data.
Bid-Level Data
Many studies use specialized data sets such as the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) and Construction Market Data. These data sets contain detailed information about all the submitted bids for specific construction projects such as pavement and road construction. Bajari 
Data about Prosecuted Collusion Cases
An alternative way of collusion detection is comparing the bidding behavior of firms with the known cases of collusive bidding behavior. Porter and Zona (1999) use this approach to examine the procurement process in Ohio school milk auctions. Some of the firms were charged for collusion and confessed to rigging bids. They conduct a regression analysis with bids of defendants in the collusion case and control group of firms that were not named as dependants. Table 1 summarizes the collusion detection methods and characteristics of the data sets used in the literature.
( Table 1 about here.) Table 1 presents that all of the existing studies use collusion detection methods that require detailed information about all submitted bids, location and cost structure of all firms or information about prosecuted firms in previous legal cases. Additionally, these studies examine concentrated data sets limited to one sector in a specific location. auctions. The PPAT data set encompasses all public procurement auctions conducted for an extended period of time by the entire set of government agencies.
These unique features of the data set allows us to conduct detailed analysis of the structure and effect of collusion in a middle-income country, namely Turkey.
The Turkish Public Procurement Law (Law no 4734) enacted in 2003 makes it mandatory that all procuring government agencies register the procurement outcomes at the PPAT. Accordingly, the PPAT governs the integrity of the data set. Table 2 below lists a subset of publicly available data sets about PP outcomes. All of these data sets contain information only about the outcomes of auctions (winning bids, number of bidders, etc.). Hence, collusive behavior in these countries cannot be examined using existing methods although these rich data sets carry valuable information.
( Table 2 about here.)
In Sections 3 and 4, we lay out the theoretical background of collusive behavior and propose an easy-to-implement estimation methodology to study collusive behavior in public procurement auctions. Then, we examine the structure and effects of collusion in the Turkish public procurement auctions by using the PPAT data set in Section 5.
Theoretical Presentation of Bid Rigging Behavior
In this section, we present a simple model of bid rigging behavior to provide the theoretical fundamentals of the new collusion detection methodology. We 
First-Price PAKT
We assume that there are R members of the bidding ring. Before submitting bids at the procurement auction, the ring members conduct a first-price PAKT and submit their bids which is an offer to pay all other members of the ring.
The winner of the PAKT represents the ring and the other ring members submit phony losing bids. Proposition 11 of Krishna (2010) (page 167) indicates that "symmetric equilibrium strategies in a first-price sealed-bid PAKT" is
where c is the cost of the bidder and Y 1 is the lowest of N − 1 independently drawn cost values. Equation (1) states that it is optimal for a ring member to truthfully submit a bid consistent with her cost. Accordingly, the ring member with the lowest cost would earn the right to represent the ring in the main auction.
Main Procurement Auction
The bidding ring suppresses competition to generate profits for its members.
Since only N − R + 1 effective bids are submitted instead of N bids, the procurement price is higher compared to the case of no ring. Only the winner of the PAKT submits a serious bid according to her cost. Other ring members submit phony bids. We assume that the main procurement auction is a sealedbid first-price auction within the independent private value paradigm. This is the case for most government procurement auctions. For example, more than 63% of the Turkish public procurement and 83% of European Union procurement are through the "open-procedure" that is first-price auctions. The other procurement methods are negotiation, restricted auction and direct purchase.
Each bidder submits a sealed bid of b i and the payoff of bidder i is
The first part of equation (2) is the payoff to winning the auction with bid, b i and the second part is the probability that the bid, b i , would win the auction.
] is the cost of bidder i. The probability can be presented as the following:
where F C is the cumulative probability distribution function of cost parameter, c i and β −1 is the equilibrium bid function. The Bayes-Nash equilibrium of this common structure is well-known as presented in Milgrom and Weber (1982) and Krishna (2010) . The Bayes-Nash, equilibrium-bid function is
Equation (4) states that bidder i submits a bid that is equal to her cost plus a positive rent component. The second rent component decreases as N decreases. The equilibrium bid approaches to the cost of the bidder as the level of competition rises. If we assume that F C is an exponential distribution, we can get a simpler presentation of the relationship between the number of bidders and the equilibrium bid as the following.
The serious bidder of the bidding ring is facing N − R + 1 effective bids instead of (N -1). Hence, its equilibrium bid is significantly higher than that of the competitive case. Specifically, equation (5) becomes
The equilibrium bid of the serious bidder of the bidding ring, β 
where b t is the winning bid at auction t. 2 Z t is a vector of auction-specific variables and M t denotes the variables that measure the macroeconomic conditions. Equation 6 states that when the winning bid is submitted by the primary bidders of the bidding ring, the procurement price is significantly higher compared to a non-ring auction. Ohashi (2009) considers the case where all bidders are ring members and states that the relationship between the number of bidders and winning bid would not be negative under collusion. Accordingly, when a bidding ring participates in the auction, equation 7 can be written as follows 
ψ t in equation 9 is the auction-specific coefficient with potentially different values for each auction t.
Varying Coefficient Model
The varying coefficient model considers that the coefficients of the regression equation might not be constant. The model estimates the dynamic pattern of regression coefficients by designing a state-space model. We assume that the auction-specific coefficient of number of bidders is an unobserved state variable.
The state-space representation consists of the state and observation equations.
State equation:
Observation equation: First, we estimate equation 7 with the unvarying number of bidders coefficient, ψ. Then, we estimate the varying coefficient, ψ t , and study the structure of collusion in Turkish public procurement. Finally, we conduct empirical analyses to examine the impact of collusion on the efficiency of public procurement. We start with the description of the data set.
Data Description
The PPAT data set used in this study contains data about all government 4 Auctioned products are categorized as construction, services and goods. We also construct dummy variables for these product types.
We use additional control variables to consider the effects of auction and 3 The Public Procurement Law Article 9 describes how the estimated cost is calculated by the contracting authority.
The Law can be accessed at http://www2.ihale.gov.tr/english/4734 English.pdf 4 The law can be accessed at http://www2.ihale.gov.tr/english/4734 English.pdf product characteristics. Firstly, we construct the ABOVE THRESHOLD dummy variable. The PPAT determines a threshold value for various types of procurement auctions according to the rules specified by the legislation and announced to the public. The auction rules vary depending on the estimated cost (ESTI-MATE) for a specific auction being above or below the threshold value. After collecting the published threshold values, we assign the value of 1 to the ABOVE THRESHOLD dummy variable if the ESTIMATE is above the threshold value, and 0 otherwise. The ABOVE THRESHOLD variable has significant practical implications. When the estimated cost is above the threshold value, the institutions have the option to offer price advantages to domestic bidders whereas if the estimate is below the threshold value, then no price advantage can be offered.
In addition, we group the auctions into regional dummies depending on Table 3 .
( Table 3 about here.)
Procurement Price and Competition
We first focus on the stable relationship between the winning bid and number of bidders by estimating the regression specification presented in equation 7 . We use OLS and GMM instrumental variable regression (IV) methods to estimate the coefficients of equation 7. Studies like Estache and Iimi (2010) argue that there might be factors that simultaneously affect the participation decisions of bidders and the winning bid. This might cause the number of bidder dummy variable to be endogenously determined. Some of the features of the Turkish public procurement system makes it easier for firms to obtain or make an educated guess about the number of potential bidders. First, firms are required to obtain official documents before the auction by paying a fee and auction participants usually observe the number of firms that obtain preauction documents. Second, during the bid submission process, firms are able to observe the firms that submit bids and correct their bids before submitting.
Accordingly, it is unlikely that the number of bidders is endogenous in Turkish public procurement auctions. Regardless of these arguments, we conduct an IV regression estimation to obtain robust results. We search for valid instrumental variables and conduct a GMM IV in addition to OLS. Table 4 displays the OLS and GMM IV estimation of equation 7. We calculate heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors for both OLS and GMM IV.
( Table 4 about Table 4 shows that we accept the null hypothesis that BIGCITY and GENERALBUDGET are valid instruments. Then we conduct a C statistic test to examine whether the instrumented variable, number of bidders (N t ), is exogenous. We accept the null hypothesis that N t is exogenous. We also note that the coefficient of N t is similar in both OLS and GMM estimations. Table 4 The tables that contain the coefficients and statistics are not presented in the paper. The tables are available from the author upon request.
6 might be confirmed empirically. We further investigate this argument by calculating the varying coefficients of the number of bidders variable, ψ t , for each auction.
Auction-Specific Coefficients as a Collusion Detection Tool
In section 4, we argue that auction-specific ψ t can be used to measure the level of collusion in PP auctions. In this section, we estimate auction-specific ψ t for each auction t by using the state-space model and maximum likelihood estimation described in Section 4.1. Figure 2 behavior. Accordingly, we use the auction-specific number of bidders coefficient as our collusive-behavior measure. This collusion measure serves as a proxy for a bidding-ring member winning a PP auction. Hence, one can use this measure to order the level of collusive behavior in an auction. 6 Theoretical findings of equations 5 and 6 suggest that auctions with higher levels of the measure would have significantly higher levels of winning bids after controlling for all auction 6 We would like to note that the only unerring method to detect collusion is through confessions of ring members and legal prosecution. Our measure provides policy-makers and researchers a tool to rank auctions with respect to level of competition and potential collusive behavior in those auctions.
characteristics. We empirically test this argument by estimating the following regression equation by using OLS and GMM IV.
λ gauges the impact of collusive behavior on the auction outcome. Equation   6 indicates that λ would be significant and positive showing that the winning bid increases as collusion becomes more severe. Table 5 displays the estimated coefficients of equation 12.
( Table 5 about here.) Table 5 Accordingly, Table 5 shows that the collusion measure correctly identifies inefficient auctions with higher values of winning bids.
Determinants of the Collusion Measure
In this section, we conduct further empirical analysis to identify the factors that cause the changes in the collusion measure, the coefficient of number of bidders. The continuous nature of the collusion measure allows us to rank auctions with respect to suspected collusive behavior and conduct regression analysis to examine the determinants of the measure. We examine the following auction characteristics on the level of the collusion measure: level of competition (number of bidders), whether the estimated cost is above the threshold determined by the PPA, sector and stimulus regions . Table 6 displays the OLS and probit regression analysis where the dependent variables are the collusion measure and the positive measure dummy variable.
( Table 6 about here.) Table 6 allows us to examine the factors that make an auction more prone to collusive bidding. We find that the level of competition has a negative and significant impact on collusion. Auctions with higher level of competition (number of bidders) experience lower levels of collusive behavior. In addition, auctions with higher estimated costs where the above threshold dummy variable is positive have higher collusive bidding. In other words, auctions with higher procurement prices attract collusive behavior. This finding is consistent with rent-seeking by bidding rings. We find that goods and construction auctions have higher levels of collusion measure compared to services. An interesting result is the impact of region on collusive behavior. We find that the least developed region with highest government economic subsidies experience higher levels of collusion. This might be caused by the fact that expected profit is higher in those auctions because of the economic incentives provided by the government.
Conclusion
We propose an alternative collusion detection methodology that can be implemented to data sets with limited information. Many available data sets about PP contain data about the outcomes of PP auctions, that is the winning bid.
Starting from theoretical arguments about bid-rigging behavior, we argue that the auction-specific coefficient of number of bidders can be used as a collusion measure. Since the bidding rings limit competition, the level of competition measured as the number of bidders would have a significantly lower effect com-pared to competitive auctions. The effect will diminish further as the collusion becomes more severe. Using data about the outcome of auctions, a policy-maker or a researcher can calculate this new measure using standard econometric tools and software without the need for complex theoretical derivations.
We estimate the collusion measure using the data about Turkish PP auctions.
We find that the measure varies substantially across 565,298 public procurement auctions for the years 2005-2012. We conduct further empirical analysis which displays the positive relationship between procurement cost and the measure.
This result shows that inefficient auctions that are susceptible to collusion can be ranked and identified using the measure. Finally, we find that the collusion measure decreases when the number of bidders increase and the measure is higher for auctions with high estimated costs. We believe that policy-makers can use this easy-to-implement methodology to examine data sets with limited information.
Specifically, collusion and efficiency in many publicly available data sets such as, the TED data set about EU procurement and CompraNet data of procurement in Mexico, can be analyzed using this new measure. Usually, more than 100,000 procurement auctions are conducted annually in a single developing country. It
is impossible for authorities to analyze each auction in detail. Policy-makers can use the measure developed in this paper to rank auctions with respect to their susceptibility to bid-rigging and allocate more resources to examine auctions with very high collusion-measure values. Additionally, common properties of auctions with high levels of the collusion measure can be examined to identify auctions with higher probability of bid-rigging. Authorities can pay more attention to auctions with those common properties. To sum up, we hope that policy-makers would find this tool helpful and use it to improve PP efficiency by identifying auctions with limited competition. 
